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BOOK REVIEWS
By Lewis M. Simes.1 St.
Paul, West Publishing Co., 1951. Pp. xv, 495. $8.00.

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS.

In the preface to his latest work Professor Simes notes that law teachers
Future
for many years "have felt the need for a concise textbook on .
Interests which could be placed in the hands of their students" (p.v.), and
that the practicing lawyer too may find such a text "helpful in securing the
broad view of general principles which he so often needs before examining
the almost infinite ramifications of the local law pertaining to a partcicular
case." (p.v.) Cognizant of Professor Simes' eminence in the property field,
we may assume that even the bench will utilize this addition to the few modern
commentaries on the problems implicit in our inherited future interests struc2
ture.
The contents of this member of the hornbook series, already hailed as
"a clear, concise, well written book . . . by a master of the subject. ' 3 are
subdivided as follows: Part I: The Feudal Heritage (historical introduction,
classification of future interests, the destructibility rule, the Rule in Shelley's
Case, the Worthier Title Doctrine) ; Part 2: Characteristics of Future Interests (transfer, creditors' claims, partition and judicial sale, protection against
possessory holder and third parties, effect of adverse possession and like
statutes); Part 3: Powers of Appointment; Part 4: Construction (including
class gifts) ; Part 5 : Restraints on Alienation and Perpetuities. This arrangement parallels that of Simes' casebook 4 and roughly approximates that of
Leach's.5 Since the problem of policy limits on dead-hand control permeates
the field of future interests, the subject of restraints might have been introduced at an earlier point, but concededly that is easier said than done. The
pattern followed is the traditional one. 6
1. Mechem Professor of Law, University of Michigan; author, THE LAW OF FUTURE
(1936) (3 vols.).
2. Although CaEY AND SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1941), is
recent and is comparatively short (670 pages), its emphasis on local law probably disINTERESTS

courages its utilization by students. This is unfortunate, for it is highly readable and
thought-provoking. SPITZ, CONDITIONAL AND FUTURE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY (1912), is

much shorter (269 pages) but has not been brought up to date. 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY-FuTuRE INTERESTS (1947), is part of a three volume

treatise.
3. Jones, Book Review, 4 J. LEGAL EDuc. 109 (1951).
SIMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ONTTHE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1951).
5. LEACH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1940).
6. POWELL, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1937), has substantially the same
arrangement as SIMEs, op. cit. supra note 4 and LEACH, op. cit. supra note 5.

4.
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I do not profess expertness in the field of future interests.7 Rather, I am
one of those struggling students toward whom, in part at least, Simes'
commentary is directed. As such, I'm interested not only in what the traditional statements of future interests law are, but also in where they originated
and how they are used by lawyers and judges. But beyond that, I'd like to
discover the purposes which underlie their manipulation in order to determine
whether decisions reached square with objectives sought.
Insofar as anyone can, Simes provides answers to the initial question of
mot students. Indeed, the blackletter encountered in this hornbook rivals
that of the Restatement, upon which Simes heavily relies.8 Functional equivalents are largely ignored,9 but then, they usually are. The accepted doctrine
is set out as fully as circumstances permit. Appropriate commentary thereon
is provided.
In our attempt to master the fundamentals of property law, we have
been admonished not to abandon history.' 0 Simes does not. He not only at an
early point" devotes some dozen pages to the origins and the development of
English land law, but also makes brief references throughout his text to
pertinent historical background. 1 2 Such allusions are helpful. Handicapped
though he is by space limitations, Simes does a good job of recounting the
accepted version of where the law came from.
Furthermore, he assures us that "an effort has been made to eliminate
the abracadabra so often found in discussions of this field of the law." (p.v.)
The book reflects the attempt. For example, he demonstrates that "alternative
7. He is a brave man who does. I'm reminded of a passage from Leach, Powers of
Sale in' Trustees 'and the Rule against Perpetuities,47 HARV. L. REV. 948, 950 (1934) :
"The astute reader will gather that the foregoing localized attack on the credibility of
Professor Gray is the product of a fear complex. And this is correct .... It is a matter
of some temerity to cross swords with the master upon his own battleground. But some
care will be taken herein to show that he gave the problem [validity of powers of sale]
little consideration and (speak it softly) misread a few cases."
8. "Throughout these pages I have treated the American Law Institute Restatement
of the Law of Property as original source material and as the 'standard of perfection' in
this field of law, as indeed it is." (P. v.) The appearance of the volumes of the Restatement of Property on Future Interests did not evoke universal acclaim. See
McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform. 55
HARv. L. REv. 1077 (1942), the last line of which reads as follows: "To make a superb
inventory of Augean stables is not to cleanse them." Id. at 1115.
9. ". . .the possibility of reverter arising on the creation of a determinable fee or
fee simple conditional is a different type of future interest from the power of termination
and should not be confused with the latter." (p. 45.) But cf.: "It is easy to overemphasize
the importance of . . . classification of future interests. For there are many situations
in which a rule of law applies to two or more interests indiscriminately . . . ." (p. 24.)
10. "That key [to the understanding of the common law of real property] is the historical approach. Without it the law of real property is a meaningless puzzle, a matter
of mere words. With it one understands and goes ahead to better things, for the historicat
approach does not mean a slavery to the past." Bordwell, Book Review, I J. LEGAL EDUC.
326, 327 (1948).
11. Chapter 2.
12. For example, he devotes several pages (169-71) to explaining the origins of the
power of appointment.
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contingent remainders" can be transformed into a "vested remainder" and an
"executory interest."'13 The student seeking some familiarity with traditional
statements of future interests law by muddling through case materials may
thereby become aware of methods of manipulation. Illustrating techniques,
as Simes does, makes perception more likely. The line between stimulating
the inquiring mind and spoon-feeding the student body is difficult to draw.
Fear of falling into the latter practice does not excuse abandonment of the
former. Who has ever succeeded in fully disclosing how the white rabbit
is produced from the future interests rag-bag? Identifying verbalisms makes
the task of the student difficult rather than easy. The use of this hornbbok
in the law school library need not be proscribed.
So long as we ask what the law is, where it originated, and how it is
handled, Simes' formulation of doctrine, his historical references, and his
demonstrations of manipulation are decidedly helpful. But when we get
beyond the elementary and try to discover why manipulation is resorted to and
whether the results achieved through manipulation implement purported objectives, we are pretty much left floundering. Part 4 of Simes' text
is devoted to construction. The initial chapter of that section (c. 16) contains some frank admissions. Consider, for example, the following:
'We may go even farther and say that some so-called rules of construction have
little or no effect in deciding cases. They are merely so much 'window dressing, used
to give a more plausible appearance to conclusions already arrived at."'
We students like such language.

In law school we thought it "realistic." Is

an observation from the, opposite page equally penetrating?
"Where do courts get the assumptions which enable them to find a meaning which
the testator was not aware of? It is believed that they draw upon their own knowledge
and experience in determining what a normal person would do under like circumstances;
and that they sometimes, consciously or unconsciously, apply ideas of sound public
policy in giving a particular meaning to the written instrument. Most important of all,
they apply rules of construction !'

Is there any distinction between applying "ideas of... public policy" (sound
or unsound) and applying "rules of construction"? When we choose between
"vested" and "contingent," between saving a gift and letting it fail, between
keeping wealth within the family and permitting it to pass to strangers, what
underlying preferences dictate the result? What inarticulated policies do
we further when applying "rules of construction"? Do such inarticulated
policies reflect the preferences of most of us on a variety of unr61ated problems (transfer of claims, limits on dead hand control, taxation, etc.) or do
13. Sim~s, p. 35.
14. SIrEs, p.259.
15. SImEs, p. 258 (italics added).
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they mirror the opinions of a powerful minority? Do our policies make
sense?
Perhaps it is too much to ask of an author that he delineate answers to
such questions in a book of modest length.' " Perhaps-but I don't think so.
The future interests structure, the interstitial doctrine, and the manipulation
of doctrine exist to a purpose. If study of the system is to be fruitful, the
purpose must be explored. When working with a small group of students, a
talented teacher has an opportunity to suggest purpose. When the class is
larger, the more astute students may hazard guesses largely unaided; the rest
are so entangled in intricacies that they lose all sight of purpose. It is members of this latter group who turn from case materials to texts. It is regrettable that Simes' hornbook, which faithfully reproduces doctrine, serves
primarily only as a vehicle for perpetuating it.17
ROBERT J. LYNN*

TAX SAVINGS IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS. Prepared by Bureau of
Analysis, Davenport, Iowa. Chicago: Published under auspices of
National Institute of Real Estate Brokers of the National Association
of Real Estate Boards, 1951. Pp. 98. $5.00.
This book, designed as a handy reference for real estate brokers, discusses
and illustrates the many tax savings and tax pitfalls that may be present in
real estate transactions. Tax problems are involved in every purchase, sale,
exchange or lease of real property. The form and timing of these transactions, being within the control of the parties, frequently present opportunities
for very substantial tax savings. Conversely, failure to recognize the tax
problems may result in costly and unnecessary tax burdens.
While this little volume is written for the lay reader, the general practitioner will find it extremely helpful (as a source of suggestions, warnings
and tax-saving possibilities) in shaping his thinking during the preliminary
negotiations between vendor and purchaser or landlord and tenant. For
example, if he represents a vendor, Chapter I reminds him that real property
may be a capital asset, a "117(j) asset" or an asset held primarily for resale;
16. Dean Prosser refused to be restricted by the hornbook tradition.

(1941).

PRossER, TORTS

17. "As long as law students are taught in strict terms of legal formulae, the teacher
need have no particular worry about the underlying political, economic, and social assumptions upon which the legal doctrines are based. The very fact that these assumptions
are submerged and not examined assures that they will be acceptable to conventional
forces of society." Emerson, Book Review, 1 J.LEGAL EDUC. 328, 330 (1948).
*Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law.
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and it points up with clear illustrations the different tax consequences which
attach to each classification. It suggests methods of partly or wholly delaying
recognition of gain or sale by use of an option, an executory contract, a conditional contract, a lease with purchase option, an installment sale, a deferred
payment sale or an escrow agreement. Tax consequences turning on the
identity of the seller-individual, partnership, corporation-with some pertinent tax-saving plans, conclude the chapter.
Chapter II deals with the problems of purchasers. The importance of
advance planning becomes apparent. Buying is rarely a taxable event. But
the tax consequences on a later sale not infrequently are fixed-consciously
or unconsciously-at the time of purchase. Cost-basis problems and specific
allocation of the price to the units purchased with future tax consequences
in mind should never be ignored. The tax effects of taking title in corporate,
individual, or joint names (too often overlooked) are stressed.
There follow chapters on tax-saving possibilities in real estate exchanges,
in leases and in mortgages, with a final chapter covering miscellaneous deductions not elsewhere treated.
This book is recommended for careful reading by the nontax lawyer who
advises on real estate matters (and what lawyer does not?). It will impress
him with the value of advance planning, with the tax-saving possibilities open
to his clients by properly shaping transactions. It will warn him of the tax
pitfalls of careless buying, selling and leasing. It will remind him that the
real estate lawyer can no longer follow the traditional patterns of the conveyancers prior to the days of the income tax. The tax share of the total
purchase price or total rental is today so large that it always is or should be
an important factor in the negotiations-frequently it is the factor which will
seal or disrupt the deal in its formative stages. Often new tax plans may bring
dead deals to life.
Since the publication of this volume the 1951 Revenue Act has introduced
important changes. The long overdue relief for the seller of residential
property who purchases a nev home has finally become law. The change in
the method of offsetting short term with long term transactions has made a
few of the examples obsolete. But the new legislation has not to any appreciable extent outdated the text. If any one of the many summaries of the
1951 Act is slipped into the cover, this book should continue to be an extremely helpful and useful guide in spotting the tax problems and tax possibilities present in typical real estate transactions.
WILLIAM
*Professor of Lav, Vanderbilt University.

J. BowE*
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IxCOME TAX TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND OTHER TAX
ARTICLES. By William J. Bowe. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,

1951. Pp. 90. $2.10.
Such a dearth of authoritative writing exists with respect to taxation of
life insurance that any worthwhile discussion of the many problems prevalent
in this ever-growing field merits careful review.
In his book entitled "Income Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Proceeds", Professor William J. Bowe of Vanderbilt University, presents in
succinct, yet understandable fashion, an analysis of some of the more important phases of this subject.
Exploring first, the Congressional intendment in the enactment of
Section 22(b) as part of the Internal Revenue Code, Professor Bowe
interestingly develops the exemption of life insurance proceeds on the one
hand, and the subjecting of them to income taxes in the cases of transfers for
value, on the other.
The author emphasizes a number of the important ways in which life
insurance constitutes a convincing response to tax problems. He persuasively
stresses ways in which estate tax savings may be effectuated through lifetime
gifts. He discusses tax problems which arise from the ownership of life
insurance policies by corporations, touching upon Section 115(g) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which entails some of the most important language in
the Code affecting life insurance, and to which all too few taxpayers pay
sufficient heed in connection with life insurance carried in corporate stock
purchase and deferred compensation arrangements.
In spite of its brevity, Professor Bowe's book offers much enlightening
information and constitutes meritorious reading for life underwriters, lawyers, accountants and trust officers.
SAMUEL

ACCORDING TO LAW. By Roscoe Pound.
versity Press 1951. Pp. 98. $2.50.

JUSTICE

J. FOOSANER*

New Haven: Yale Uni-

These 91 pages consist of three lectures delivered by Dean Pound at
Westminster College. From the blurbs and advertisements, the reader is
apparently expected to direct his attention to the third lecture of this group.
This final lecture appears after Dean Pound has discussed both Justice and
Law in his own inimitable analytical and historical fashion. Let us look
back on these expositions later because if things are as bad as the Dean
*Member, Foosaner and Saiber, Newark, New Jersey; author of numerous articles
on tax law.
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suggests they might be on their way to being, the great taught tradition of
our law may well be losing its significance.
Dean Pound shows that he does not like the practice of administrative
law. He claims it produces executive justice rather than judicial justice.
Our constitutional system was based on the principle of separation of powers.
This means that judicial function should be performed by the judiciary.
But we know, as the Dean says, that all govermental functions cannot be
neatly and clearly assigned to one or another of the govermental departments. The legislature must make an assignment. And as the years pass,
the legislature or Congress has been making such assignments. "The society
of today demands services beyond those that the state which only maintained
order and repaired injuries could maintain." (P. 78.) In providing these
services administrative agencies were created for specific purposes. For
example we have an agency to establish ceiling prices where necessary to
prevent further inflation. Dean Pound does not say that such an agency
is bad. He does say that those who favor this and similar agencies frequently
wish to make the decisions of such agencies final and do away with judicial
review. This is undesirable because "a dominant administration, not checked
by law applied by an independent judiciary, means a mere preachment bill
of rights, a hierarchy of superman administrative officials who ex officio
know what is good for us better than we know ourselves, and ultimately a
super-superman to give directions to and maintain order and eliminate friction in the hierarchy." (Pp. 83-84.) This point should not be labored. Dean
Pound does not say that court review is gone; he is using strong language to
urge vigilance in preserving judicial justice. I am sure that most of us agree
on this point. Further, it should be said that the Dean's analysis of the mind
of the administrative lawyer does not seem to reflect that mind as this
writer has seen that mind working in some major agencies of the Federal
Government. I have never heard any Government attorney fret at the
necessity of defending an administrative decision in the Emergency Court
of Appeals. There is never anything but enthusiasm at the prospect of a
challenge to court action.
My own feeling is that the greatest needs for a lawyer today are both
to get a better understanding of how our economy actually works and to
have a firm grasp of sound statistical methods. These are the essential
tools for more effective administrative action. The basic legal requirement
is that decisions of these administrative agencies should not be arbitrary
or capricious. Some pattern of rational basis should be apparent in the
explanation of these decisions. But of many possible rational patterns, not
all need to have any relation to actuality. Logic alone does not point to
actual business practice. This is the real weakness of administrative agencies
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today. It is a weakness that stems from the mind and not the heart. If
we are all the recipients of a great taught tradition there is no reason to
insist that we are likely to practice it only after we have donned judicial
robes. The sense of justice and equity are to be found in full measure
in administrative agencies.
In short, it is unlikely that any reader of this review or of Dean Pound's
little work will doubt that "the real foe of absolution is law." (P. 91.)
Such a reader will have been one of the recipients of our taught tradition
of law. The law "presupposes a life measured by reason, a legal order measured by reason, and a judicial process carried on by applying a reasoned technique to experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience."
(P. 91.) These presuppositions are examined by Dean Pound in the first
two lectures of this volume.
The end of civilized life is the maximum satisfaction of human wants
or expectations. To achieve this end we must have order in society. There
must be "systematic adjustments and reasoned orderings according to an
authoritative technique." (P. 30.) This is social engineering. "The science
of law is a science of social engineering having to do with that part of
the whole field which may be achieved by the ordering of human relations
through the action of politically organized society." (P. 30.) Since the 16th
century, the authoritative action of the political forces has held the power in
society. But this power has not been necessarily exercised in a haphazard
or arbitrary fashion. Where a judiciary was able to establish itself as an
appropriate part of the government, as in England and America, the authoritative action of that government was strongly limited by authoritative traditional ideals as voiced by the judiciary. The expressions of the judiciary are
based upon an "ideal relation among men which we seek to promote and
maintain in civilized society and toward which we direct social control."
(P. 2.) Thus the ends of men and the ideals of the judiciary are similar,
as they should be. Rights created in accordance with such an ideal are not
ethereal. They will be pragmatically founded upon the actual social order
and the normal expectations of men within such order.
This brief summary does no justice at all to the learning, understanding,
and clarity of Dean Pound. It is merely intended to show the framework
over which the Dean wanders. This little volume is a good introduction to
the work of this great legal scholar. He says it embodies the impressions of
sixty years of the practice and teaching of law. Those sixty years of gigantic
labor have surely served in no small measure to strengthen the taught tradition of the law in this country.
STANLEY D. Ros&*
*Attorney, Office of Price Stabilization, Washington, D C.
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JUSTICE SUTHERLAND. By Joel Francis Paschal. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951. Pp. xii, 267. $4.00

The author appraises this work as "not so much a biography as an
essay in government" (p. vii) and he has used as a subtitle "A Man
Against the State."
The book spotlights the sources of Sutherland's political, social and
economic views and the opportunities he enjoyed, during his public career,
to give to his views a large practical effect.
George Sutherland was born in England in 1862 and came to Utah
with his parents in 1863. He attended Brigham Young Academy (though
not a Mormon himself, his father had for a time been of that faith) and
studied law at the University of Michigan while Cooley was dean. He was a
successful practitioner in Utah and after service in the Utah legislature he
served in the Congress of the United States, first in the House (1901-03)
and later in the Senate (1905-17), afterwards engaging in practice in
Washington, D. C., until he was appointed in 1922 as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, in which capacity he served until his retirement in
1938.
He succeeded Elihu Root in 1917 as president of the American Bar
Association, lectured at Columbia University, made frequent public addresses and was a national figure at the time of his appointment to the
Supreme Court.
He was greatly concerned to see to it that an individual person not
be subjected to governmental restraints and commands which he considered
to be beyond the power of government. This concern was not confined to
economic rights but extended to the great civil liberties and human freedoms which he insisted upon. He made no apology for being "a little bit
conservative" but he protested that he did not stand still. He firmly
believed that the general good would be best advanced by giving large scope
for individual initiative. He feared government dictatorship and he opposed
the making of reforms with such speed as might extinguish the flame on the
torch of liberty.
His support was given to legislation to improve working conditions
of seamen. He advocated adoption of a workmen's compensation statute for
employees of interstate carriers, the Railway Safety Appliance Act, and the
Hours of Labor Act. He favored postal savings banks and the parcel post.
He strongly supported woman suffrage. These were some of the positions
he had taken in his public life before he became a member of the Supreme
Court.
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Aside from Sutherland's firm position against governmental interference
in the economic life of the individual the author notes that Sutherland played
a large role in the Court's general extension of the blessings of human liberty
under the Constitution and declares that Sutherland's influence in the field
of the nation's power in foreign relations "today overshadows that of all
other justices and it is not likely that it will ever be diminished." (P. 208.)
Sutherland, says the author, won perhaps the most lasting success of his
career in winning approval for the idea that the power of the United States
as to foreign relations derives from "membership in the family of nations"
and hence "is not subject to the usual constitutional restraints." (P. 221.)
In 1941, a year before Sutherland's death, he was awarded an honorary
degree by Brigham Young University and upon this occasion he prepared
an address which the author describes as:
" . . a valedictory, containing mellow recollections of days long gone and the
sage advice of a man who had reached his goal. His goal, he suggested, had been
not merely to be a good lawyer, or a good legislator, or a good judge. These were
as nothing compared to the ambition of being 'a good man."' (P. 235.)

Appendix A lists cases in which Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote opinions
while he was a member of the Supreme Court. Altogether, he wrote 313
opinions which included 24 dissenting opinions and one separate concurring
opinion.

-

Upon his retirement from active service on the bench, the other members of the Court addressed a letter to him expressing warm affection and
high appreciation of distinguished ability and unremitting devotion to the
work of the Court, his habit of thoroughness and precision, his tenacity of
purpose, unvarying kindliness and unfailing humor.
At the October Term, 1944, Resolutions were read in memory of Mr.
Justice Sutherland. Chief Justice Stone declared upon this occasion:
"The time will come when it will be recognized, perhaps more clearly than it is
at present, how fortunate it has been for the true progress of the law that, at a time
when the trend was in the opposite direction, there sat upon this Bench a man of
stalwart independence, and of the purest character who, without a trace of intellectual
arrogance, and always with respectful toleration for the views of colleagues who
differed with him, fought stoutly for the constitutional guarantees of the liberty of
the individual." (P. 245.)
LOWE WATKINS*

*Member, Nashville, Tennessee Bar; formerly Professor, Vanderbilt University
School of Law.

